June 4, 2009

Death in the lab: why aren't university labs safer?

Earlier this year, 23 year-old research assistant Sheri Sangji suffered an excruciating death after having been engulfed in flames in a UCLA science laboratory. A drop of t-butyl lithium, a substance that ignites on contact with air, spilled on her clothing causing an instant conflagration. Sheri suffered second and third degree burns over 40% of her body. Beryl Lieff Benderly writes about Sheri's death in Slate, raising the question of what makes academic laboratories such dangerous places to work? Benderly notes that the safety failures that led to this fatality were unfortunately not an anomaly in private academic laboratories:

The death of a healthy young woman from a chemical spill at a UCLA lab is deeply shocking. But the presence of flagrant safety violations at a major research university is no surprise. After reading about the Sangji incident and others like it, a columnist for the peer-reviewed journal Chemical Health and Safety wrote that he'd come to the "disheartening conclusion that most academic laboratories are unsafe venues for work or study." Though no one keeps comprehensive national statistics on laboratory safety incidents, James Kaufman, president of the Laboratory Safety Institute in Natick, Mass., estimates that accidents and injuries occur hundreds of times more frequently in academic labs than in industrial ones.

In the wake of this accident, Cal/OSHA imposed a $31,875 penalty, citing safety lapses and lack of training. Benderly notes that had Sheri been a student rather than a paid technician, her death would not have been investigated by OSHA because the occupational health and safety laws that protect workers in hazardous jobs apply only to employees, not to students. The contrast between the culture, attitudes and practices of private laboratories and academia can be dramatic. Benderly describes an all-too-frequent academic machismo that can be disdainful of practices that would enhance safety, viewing them as bureaucratic and potentially stifling to academic freedom. In fairness, similar arguments and protestations have been raised by various private industry segments in response to OSHA standards, but the difference is in accountability. With most federal grants, "... applicants are routinely asked to document the steps they will take to safeguard the people and vertebrate animals they'll be studying, but they needn't provide any information on how they'll protect the experimenters themselves."

In another article for ScienceCareers, Benderly uses this incident as a springboard to discuss the issue of safety in academic laboratories in greater depth. In Taken for Granted: The Burning Question of Laboratory Safety, after examining various reports of the accident, she points to two areas that require attention, both in the UCLA lab, and frequently in other academic settings. These will be no surprise to safety professionals anywhere: better training and the need for a safety commitment that starts with the senior-most level of an organization. "The impetus to make safety a priority in academic labs must come from those able to enforce consequences."

She is right. There are rock star academics whose research can bring huge grants and critical acclaim to a university. Safety is generally not a criteria that is evaluated as a part of their record, but it certainly should be. Benderly makes a compelling case that federal funding sources and university officials need to add safety as a criteria of evaluation to foster a culture of safety that will protect researchers as well as the research subjects.



Although I appreciate Ms. Benderly's efforts, I fundamentally disagree with her suggestions that safety records be key drivers for tenure/promotion decisions. I lay out my reasoning here:


Certainly agree that suggestion to make safety records a key driver for tenure descisions is ignorant. Not to mention self-serving, when made by a "safety professional." I worked in academic chem & physics labs as an undergrad, grad & professor and am now in the risk management biz. H&S professionals are fine at setting job place protocols for simple things - like handling common solvents. But they are completely unqualified to set protocols for "exotic" procedures - like manipulations under inert atmospheres using pyrophoric reagents. Perhaps university should require supervising professor to establish H&S protocols but it is clear to me that university (or other) H&S staff are generally unqualified to do so.

It's also worth noting that mishandling solvent (as per Mr. Rosenfeld's comment) is far more common and can be just as destructive to life and property. I would guess that most of Lynch Ryan's cases not as relatively exotic as the Sangji case.

The young lady should have gone directly to the safety shower located within 4 feet. Why she did not go must be related to panic and no previous training reinforcing the location of the shower and its worth in preventing more harsh consequences. Tragic.


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This page contains a single entry by Julie Ferguson published on June 4, 2009 8:46 AM.

Cavalcade of Risk: 3rd Anniversary Edition, and other news briefs was the previous entry in this blog.

Suffering for Art is the next entry in this blog.

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